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WINDSOR BEYOND MARRIAGE: DUE PROCESS, EQUALITY
& UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRATION

ANTHONY O’ROURKE*

ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Windsor,
invalidating part of the federal Defense of Marriage Act, presents a
significant interpretive challenge. Early commentators have
criticized the majority opinion’s lack of analytical rigor, and
expressed doubt that Windsor can serve as a meaningful precedent
with respect to constitutional questions outside the area of same-sex
marriage. This Article offers a more rehabilitative reading of
Windsor and shows how the decision can be used to analyze a
significant constitutional question concerning the use of state
criminal procedure to regulate immigration.
From Windsor’s holding, the Article distills two concrete doctrinal
propositions concerning the Due Process Clause’s application in cases
that have significant equality dimensions. It then shows how one can
use these propositions to evaluate the constitutionality of state laws
that categorically deny bail to undocumented immigrants. The
Article thereby makes a significant practical contribution to the
burgeoning constitutional “dignity” literature. Furthermore, it offers
an interpretation of Windsor that will be welcomed by those who
applaud the recent triumphs of gay rights advocates in the Supreme
Court but lament the stagnation and regression of constitutional
protections for other groups.
* Associate Professor of Law, SUNY Buffalo Law School. This Article was inspired by,
and draws upon, an amici curiae brief I authored on behalf of a number of constitutional law
and immigration law professors. I am grateful to all of them. For helpful comments on early
drafts of this Article, I am indebted to Michael Boucai, Meredith Kolsky, Joseph Landau,
Matthew Steilen, Christine Varnado, and participants of the SUNY Buffalo Law School
Junior Faculty Forum. Thanks also to Alex Lott and the staff of the William & Mary Law
Review for their excellent editorial work.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s merits holding in United States v. Windsor1
is unquestionably significant, but nobody is quite sure how so. Few
have described the majority’s decision striking down Section 3 of the
federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)2 as uncharitably—or as
memorably—as Justice Scalia when he called it a “disappearing
trail of ... legalistic argle-bargle.”3 Even among those who celebrate
Windsor’s outcome, however, the case’s holding and doctrinal
implications are subjects of sharp disagreement.4
Of particular interest to legal observers is this passage from the
majority opinion: “While the Fifth Amendment itself withdraws
from Government the power to degrade or demean in the way this
law does, the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment makes that Fifth Amendment right all the more specific and
all the better understood and preserved.”5 To quote Justice Scalia,
“what can that mean?”6
This Article suggests what “that” might mean, and shows in
concrete terms how one can apply Windsor to clarify other doctrinally confused areas of due process law.7 The majority opinion in
Windsor, I contend, articulated a conception of due process that is
informed by, but analytically distinct from, the Court’s equal
protection jurisprudence. So interpreted, Windsor’s holding is
consistent with the theory developed by Laurence Tribe and Kenji
Yoshino, among others,8 that the Court is gradually synthesizing
1. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
2. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) (codified
at 1 U.S.C. § 7) (defining marriage for purposes of federal law as “a legal union between one
man and one woman as husband and wife”).
3. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2709 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
4. See infra Part I.A.
5. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695.
6. Id. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
7. Windsor also held that, notwithstanding the Executive’s decision not to defend DOMA
in court, the United States had Article III standing, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group
(BLAG) of the House of Representatives had Article III standing, and BLAG’s participation
in the case assuaged any prudential concerns that would counsel against deciding the case
on the merits. See id. at 2683-89. Discussion of this holding is beyond the scope of this Article.
8. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Destabilizing Due Process and Evolutive Equal
Protection, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1183, 1216 (2000); Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of Equal
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its due process and equal protection doctrines to recognize what
Yoshino calls “liberty-based dignity claim[s]” rooted in the Due
Process Clauses.9 Indeed, early commentators were quick to
recognize that Windsor easily reads as a “dignity” case.10 There has
been little discussion, however, of how Windsor’s holding might
clarify the doctrinal stakes of the dignity framework.
Windsor offers an occasion for a much-needed practical contribution to the burgeoning dignity literature. While Tribe and Yoshino
have created a theoretically rich and intellectually generative
framework for understanding the Court’s liberty/equality jurisprudence, scholars have done little to show how legal practitioners can
apply that jurisprudence. For lawyers who cannot simply discard
earlier precedents in favor of a more satisfying dignity framework—that is to say, for any lawyer not sitting on the United States
Supreme Court—the current scholarship offers little guidance.
Indeed, Jack Balkin has raised the possibility that, in Windsor, the
Supreme Court dispensed with any predictable conception of due
process or equal protection and signaled that it “will simply proceed
on a case-by-case basis, relying on the unifying concept of dignity,
which straddles liberty and equality concerns.”11 Such doctrinal
slipperiness should alarm those who applaud recent triumphs of gay
rights advocates in the Supreme Court,12 but lament the stagnation
and regression of constitutional protections for other groups.13
Citizens: Groups and the Due Process Clause, 55 UCLA L. REV. 99, 137-38 (2007); Reva B.
Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117
YALE L.J. 1694, 1741-45 (2008); Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108
MICH. L. REV. 459, 461 (2010); Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental
Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1902-07 (2004); Kenji Yoshino,
The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747 (2011).
9. Yoshino, supra note 8, at 750.
10. See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
11. Jack Balkin, Teaching Materials for the Marriage Cases, BALKINIZATION (July 26,
2013, 9:00 AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/07/teaching-materials-for-marriage-cases.
html.
12. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
578 (2003) (invalidating state sodomy statute); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1997)
(invalidating a state constitutional provision that barred municipalities from passing laws
that prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation).
13. I am grateful to Michael Boucai for the turn of phrase. For examples of the stagnation
and regression, see Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (invalidating
Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.
1, 551 U.S. 701, 747-48 (2007) (invalidating school districts’ race-conscious desegregation
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But Windsor’s holding, I argue, can do more than simply advance
the interests, on a case-by-case basis, of groups that find favor with
Justice Kennedy. To be sure, the Windsor majority offered little
guidance as to how its decision should be prospectively applied.
Indeed, although the majority states that DOMA violates both “due
process and equal protection principles,” its reasoning has left some
confused as to how these principles informed the Court’s decision.14
But while Windsor cannot be used to predict how the Supreme
Court will decide constitutional questions beyond same-sex
marriage, one can distill principles from the majority opinion that
can be used to independently analyze and resolve such questions.15
To do so, one must look beyond what the Windsor majority said
about the constitutional principles it relied upon and examine the
logic of what the majority did in striking down § 3 of DOMA.16
By adopting such an approach, this Article constructs a rehabilitative reading of Windsor that builds upon the theoretical insights
of the dignity literature, but can be applied in other due process
contexts to advance the interests of other subordinated groups. The
argument proceeds in three Parts. In Part I, I distill two practical,
doctrinal propositions from Windsor’s synthesis of due process and
equal protection doctrine. In Part II, I set the stage for extending
Windsor’s holding beyond gay rights by describing a constitutional
problem that has received little judicial or scholarly attention
programs); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007) (upholding the federal Partial-Birth
Abortion Act of 2003); see also Yoshino, supra note 8, at 799 (citing the decision in Gonzales
v. Carhart as “a cautionary tale against the dangers of a liberty-based dignity jurisprudence”).
14. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693; see, e.g., William Baude, Interstate Recognition of SameSex Marriage After Windsor, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 150, 154 (2013) (asserting that the
majority in Windsor “does not even clarify whether the decision is ultimately rooted in ‘equal
protection’ principles or in so-called ‘substantive due process’ principles”).
15. See Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651, 661-71
(1995) (contrasting the “prediction model” of legal decision making with an “elaboration
model” of legal decision making); cf. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 147 (William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (arguing that officials should interpret vague legal sources
“in the way which best harmonizes with more basic principles and policies of law”).
16. This phrasing is inspired by Laurence Tribe’s criticism of Justice Scalia’s Windsor
dissent. See Larry Tribe, DOMA, Prop 8, and Justice Scalia’s Intemperate Dissent,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2013, 2:24 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/doma-prop-8-andjustice-scalias-intemperate-dissent/ (“[Scalia’s dissent] suggests to [lower courts] that they
ought to feel free to track what the Supreme Court says rather than to fathom, and then do
their best to follow, the logic of what it does.”).
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concerning the use of state criminal procedure to regulate immigration.17 In Part III, I show how the doctrinal propositions I distill
from Windsor can be used to address this problem.
As to Windsor’s doctrinal propositions, the case offers two pieces
of guidance for courts evaluating due process claims that have a
significant equality dimension. First, a law that threatens a liberty
interest is more likely to violate due process if it selectively imposes
a historically novel burden on a subordinated group.18 This proposition, if correct, suggests that a modest revision to the dignity
literature is in order. Specifically, Yoshino has argued that, in
recognizing a “liberty-based dignity” claim in Lawrence v. Texas, the
Court embraced a conception of due process that “struck the chains
of history from due process jurisprudence.”19 Such end-of-history
claims may be premature, however. Windsor’s holding is predicated
on a historical analysis of how power has been allocated between the
federal government and the states with respect to regulating
marriage.20 In evaluating DOMA’s constitutionality, the majority
examines both the states’ historical role in defining the marital
relation and the federal government’s historical restraint in this
area of law. This examination yields two interrelated doctrinal
innovations with respect to how the Court uses history to evaluate
due process claims. First, in areas of law that states have traditionally regulated, a state may legislate in ways that strengthen its
citizens’ constitutionally protected liberty interests.21 Second, and
relatedly, if the government infringes a liberty interest by intervening in an area of law that it has not traditionally regulated, courts
will be particularly skeptical of the government’s justifications if the
intervention happens to harm a politically subordinated group.22
But what does it mean to say that a court will be “particularly
skeptical” of a government’s asserted justification? The second
17. For a notable exception to the relative lack of scholarly attention to the constitutional
problems related to this area of law, see Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The
Unconstitutionality of State Regulation of Immigration Through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE L.J.
251 (2011).
18. See infra Part I.C.
19. Yoshino, supra note 8, at 779-80.
20. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689-92 (2013).
21. See infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
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proposition this Article distills from Windsor speaks to that issue.
Specifically, if a law selectively targets a subordinated group, courts
should assign significant weight to evidence in the legislative record
suggesting that the law was enacted for a purpose that violates due
process.23 The relevance of legislative history as to whether a law
violates the Constitution’s due process or equal protection guarantees has long been unclear.24 One question that has triggered
particular confusion is the extent to which the constitutionally
impermissible motivations of individual legislators should be ascribed to the legislature as a whole.25 Windsor helps resolve this
question by showing that when a due process claim has a significant
equality dimension, individuals’ motivations matter.26
As for a serious constitutional problem that Windsor’s holding can
help resolve: three states have recently enacted laws that categorically deny bail to undocumented immigrants who have been
arrested for a broad range of felonies.27 These laws raise obvious
equality concerns, as they forbid courts from granting bail to
undocumented immigrants, but permit (and, for most cases, require)
them to make individualized bail determinations for all other
defendants. It is difficult, however, to evaluate the constitutionality
of these laws under the Court’s equal protection doctrine with any
degree of analytical rigor.28 The Court’s due process jurisprudence,
by contrast, offers a relatively tractable framework for analyzing the
laws.29 Specifically, under United States v. Salerno, a bail restriction
violates due process if Congress expressly intended for it to be punitive;30 otherwise the restriction will satisfy due process if it has a
“legitimate regulatory goal” and is not “excessive in relation” to that
goal.31
However, several questions concerning Salerno’s scope caused
confusion for the only federal appellate court that has reviewed one
23. See infra Part I.D.
24. See infra notes 95-105 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
27. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 22(A)(4); ALA. CODE § 31-13-18 (2012); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 544.470(2) (2008).
28. See infra Part II.A.
29. See infra Part II.B.
30. 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987).
31. Id.
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of these laws. In a recent opinion,32 which is being reconsidered en
banc as this Article goes to print,33 the Ninth Circuit upheld a
provision of the Arizona constitution that categorically denies bail
to any undocumented immigrant arrested for a broad range of
felonies,34 some of which are relatively trivial.35 Applying the doctrinal propositions identified in Part I of this Article, one can clarify
Salerno’s due process doctrine and construct a more analytically
satisfying account than the Ninth Circuit panel was able to provide
as to whether the Arizona bail law satisfies due process.36
As the analysis in this Article shows, one does not need to break
new constitutional ground to show how laws that categorically deny
bail to undocumented immigrants run afoul of the Due Process
Clause. I do not argue, for example, that the Ninth Circuit faced a
constitutional problem it could not solve without recourse to a
controversial dignity doctrine that is taking root in the Supreme
Court’s gay rights jurisprudence. Indeed, the objective of this Article
is to show how lawyers and judges can use Windsor to clarify and
refine even very basic and traditional due process claims. By
carefully attending to Windsor’s holding and analyzing how it
coheres with due process doctrines in other subareas of constitutional law, one can construct orthodox arguments for a wide range
of constitutional claims beyond the area of gay rights.

32. See Lopez-Valenzuela v. Cnty. of Maricopa, 719 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2013).
33. See Status of Pending En Banc Cases, U.S. CTS. FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, http://www.
ca9.uscourts.gov/enbanc/ (last updated Apr. 8, 2014).
34. See ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 22(A)(4); Lopez-Valenzuela, 719 F.3d at 1059-60, 1064.
35. See infra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
36. The Ninth Circuit panel’s decision in Lopez-Valenzuela was released just eight days
before Windsor was decided. Cf. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2675 (2013)
(published June 26, 2013); Lopez-Valenzuela, 719 F.3d at 1054 (published June 18, 2013).
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I. WHAT WINDSOR SAYS
A. Windsor’s Liberty/Equality Framework
Even among those who celebrated Windsor’s outcome, some found
its holding confused at best37 and nonsensical at worst.38 Though it
may be more coherent than some attackers suggest, Windsor
undeniably presents an interpretive challenge. Writing for the
majority, Justice Kennedy declared DOMA invalid because it
“violates basic due process and equal protection principles applicable to the Federal Government.”39 Early commentators hotly contest
the meaning and doctrinal basis of this statement. Some agree with
Chief Justice Roberts that the majority’s decision is “based on
federalism”40 or on some combination of federalism, due process, and
equal protection principles.41 Others seem to interpret the majority
opinion as a conventional application of the Court’s equal protection
doctrine as it is incorporated against the federal government under

37. See, e.g., Sandy Levinson, A Brief Comment on Justice Kennedy’s Opinion in Windsor,
BALKINIZATION (June 26, 2013, 11:50 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/06/a-briefcomment-on-justice-kennedys.html (“Already there is some ... nit-picking about the doctrinal
problems with Windsor.”).
38. E.g., Gerard N. Magliocca, This Pudding Lacks a Theme, BALKINIZATION (June 26,
2013, 11:10 AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/06/this-pudding-lacks-theme.html (stating
that “the Court’s rationale for why [Windsor’s] holding applies only to DOMA is nonsensical”
and finding “Justice Kennedy’s opinion hard to understand”).
39. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693.
40. Id. at 2697 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
41. See, e.g., Randy Barnett, Federalism Marries Liberty in the DOMA Decision,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2013, 3:37 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/federalismmarries-liberty-in-the-doma-decision/; Rick Pildes, Why Justice Kennedy’s DOMA Opinion Has
the Unique Legal Structure It Has, BALKINIZATION (June 26, 2013, 1:34 PM), http://balkin.
blogspot.com/2013/06/why-justice-kennedys-doma-opinion-has.html; Tribe, supra note 16. For
a contrary view, see Deborah Hellman, Scalia Is Right: Justice Kennedy’s Opinion in Windsor
Doesn’t Rest on Federalism, BALKINIZATION (June 27, 2013, 5:29 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.
com/2013/06/normal-0-false-false-false-en-us-x-none.html?m=0.
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Bolling v. Sharpe.42 Doubtless other competing interpretations of
Windsor’s doctrinal basis will soon be forthcoming.
Particularly striking, however, is how well Windsor’s holding was
forecasted by those who argue that the Court is gradually synthesizing its equality and liberty jurisprudence to recognize new constitutional “dignity” claims. Laurence Tribe was among the first to
develop this theory with his influential reading of Lawrence v. Texas
as a case that “both presupposed and advanced an explicitly
equality-based and relationally situated theory of substantive
liberty.”43 Building on this insight, Kenji Yoshino has argued that,
“[i]n practice, the Court does not abide by” the distinction between
“the equality claims made under the [Constitution’s] equal protection guarantees and the liberty claims made under the due process
or other guarantees.”44 The Court, Yoshino contends, often uses “the
Due Process Clauses to further equality concerns.”45 In cases
involving the rights of sexual minorities,46 abortion,47 and the scope
of Congress’s lawmaking power under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment,48 the Court has shifted its equality jurisprudence away
from the Equal Protection Clause and toward “liberty-based dignity
claims” grounded in the Due Process Clauses.49

42. 347 U.S. 497 (1954); see, e.g., Mike Dorf, A Publicity Update and Then Three Thoughts
on Justice Scalia’s Dissent in Windsor, DORF ON LAW (June 28, 2013, 10:37 AM), http://www.
dorfonlaw.org/2013/06/a-publicity-update-and-then-three.html (“[T]here is much to regret
about the fact that in Romer [v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)], Lawrence [v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003)] and now Windsor, the Court has failed to specify the level of scrutiny it is applying as
a matter of equal protection doctrine (in Romer and Windsor) or substantive due process
doctrine (in Lawrence).”); Suzanne Goldberg, A One-Two Punch to the Nation’s Most
Prominent Antigay Laws, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2013, 2:07 PM), http://www.scotusblog.
com/2013/06/a-one-two-punch-to-the-nations-most-prominent-antigay-laws/ (“In essence, ...
even when DOMA first arrived, the Court’s equality jurisprudence contained the seeds of its
demise.”).
43. Tribe, supra note 8, at 1898.
44. Yoshino, supra note 8, at 749. Yoshino’s central thesis is that the Court’s doctrinal
shift toward “dignity” claims reflects the nation’s growing “pluralism anxiety,” which he
defines as “an apprehension of and about” the nation’s “demographic diversity.” Id. at 751.
45. Id.
46. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
47. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973).
48. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
49. See Yoshino, supra note 8, at 776-85.
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Commentators quickly identified the majority’s opinion as an
instance of this dignity jurisprudence. As Deborah Hellman observed, the words “dignity” and “indignity” together appear ten
times in the relatively short majority opinion.50 Moreover, as Justice
Scalia bitterly observed in dissent, the majority failed to articulate
a standard of review conforming to the tiered system that was, for
a few decades, a hallmark of the Court’s equal protection doctrine.51
Regarding this omission, Jack Balkin proffered the following
discussion question for those seeking to teach Windsor:
Dignity. Kennedy’s opinion repeatedly speaks of liberty. Sometimes he seems to mean that a guarantee of equal protection is
contained within the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of liberty
with due process. At other times he seems to speak of the liberty
protected by the Fifth Amendment as more than simply a
guarantee of equal protection. Thus, another possibility is that
the Court has abandoned the tiered standards of review—as
evidenced by Casey, Romer, and Lawrence—and will simply
proceed on a case-by-case basis, relying on the unifying concept
of dignity, which straddles liberty and equality concerns.52

While the scholarly consensus as to the best interpretation of Windsor
remains to be settled, this one will certainly be a contender.
But observing that Windsor’s holding synthesizes equality and
liberty principles into a dignity jurisprudence is one thing. Applying
that observation is quite another. Unfortunately, the current dignity
literature contains little doctrinal guidance for lawyers, appellate
court judges, and others who must take stare decisis seriously.
While much has been written about the blending of dignity and
equality principles in constitutional law, this scholarship has
focused on the one institution that can disregard precedent in favor
of a more satisfying conception of equality: the Supreme Court.53
50. Hellman, supra note 41.
51. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In accord with
my previously expressed skepticism about the Court’s ‘tiers of scrutiny’ approach, I would
review this classification only for its rationality. As nearly as I can tell, the Court agrees with
that; its opinion does not apply strict scrutiny, and its central propositions are taken from
rational-basis cases .... But the Court certainly does not apply anything that resembles that
deferential framework.”) (citations omitted).
52. Balkin, supra note 11.
53. See sources cited supra note 8.
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This approach to constitutional doctrine yields important theoretical
insights but offers little to practitioners who must frame their
claims in conventional doctrinal terms. Yoshino, for example,
characterizes his analysis of the “new equal protection” as an
exercise in “look[ing] past doctrinal categories to see that the rights
secured within those categories are often hybrid rights.”54 Similarly,
Balkin has suggested that Windsor can best be understood by
“look[ing] behind the doctrinal superstructure, which explains little,
and see[ing] the deeper principles at stake, principles that have a
long history in American constitutional thought.”55
This does not mean, however, that a theoretical analysis of the
Court’s dignity jurisprudence cannot produce specific doctrinal
propositions that lawyers and judges can operationalize when
evaluating new constitutional claims. Commenting on the dignity
reading of Lawrence v. Texas, Michael Boucai has observed that the
Court’s blending of due process and equality principles is “not ... an
invitation to collapse one value into the other, as if personal freedom
were a mere instrumentality of social parity.”56 Likewise, Windsor’s
synthesis of equal protection and due process jurisprudence does not
preclude practitioners from maintaining a distinction between equal
protection and due process claims, all the while using one set of
doctrines to inform the other. Accordingly, this Article offers two
simple doctrinal propositions based on how the Windsor majority
uses equal protection cases to clarify the liberty interests protected
under the Constitution’s Due Process Clauses.
B. The Liberty Interest in Windsor
The majority opinion in Windsor undoubtedly synthesizes equal
protection and due process doctrine in ways that are both novel and
difficult to untangle. Nevertheless, it is possible to reconstruct
Justice Kennedy’s analysis in conventionally doctrinal terms, and
to thus relate Windsor’s holding to constitutional problems beyond
54. Yoshino, supra note 8, at 750.
55. Jack Balkin, Windsor and the Constitutional Prohibition Against Class Legislation,
BALKINIZATION (June 26, 2013, 1:05 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/06/windsor-andconstitutional-prohibition.html.
56. Michael Boucai, Sexual Liberty and Same-Sex Marriage: An Argument from
Bisexuality, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 415, 423 (2012).
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same-sex marriage. One way of making sense of Windsor is to show
the ways in which the majority used equal protection principles to
identify and define the scope of the constitutionally protected liberty interest. This reading of Windsor, however, is not self-evident.
Granted, the Court expressly stated that DOMA “violates basic due
process and equal protection principles,”57 but should this statement
be taken at face value? As Douglas NeJaime has observed, the
complaint in Windsor raised only an equal protection claim, and
“Edi[th] Windsor did not assert a claim based on the fundamental right to marry.”58 This litigation posture quite sensibly leads
NeJaime to conclude that the Court’s decision rests on equal
protection grounds, and that the Court postpones any consideration
of whether laws prohibiting same-sex marriage violate substantive
due process.59 On this reading, Windsor is best read as an opinion
granting what Kenji Yoshino calls an “equality-based dignity claim”
grounded in equal protection principles that the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause makes applicable to the federal government.60
Undeniably, Windsor has reshaped the doctrinal landscape for
equal protection claims based on sexual orientation.61 A close
reading of Windsor, however, reveals not only that the majority
opinion identifies a liberty interest protected under the Due Process
Clauses, but that this liberty interest is integral to the Court’s
holding. Specifically, the majority focuses on the effect that laws
regulating marriage have on the intimate (and, the Court assumes,
dyadic) “bond” that forms between those who undertake a lifelong
sexual commitment to one another.62 In Lawrence v. Texas,63 the
57. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2963 (2013) (emphasis added).
58. Douglas NeJaime, Windsor’s Right to Marry, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 219, 219 (2013);
see also Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Windsor
does not argue that DOMA affects the fundamental right to marry.”); Amended Complaint
¶¶ 84-85, Windsor, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (No. 10 Civ. 8435 (BSJ)).
59. According to NeJaime, Windsor was not decided on substantive due process grounds,
but the majority opinion nevertheless “elaborates a model” of marriage that is “consistent
with the Court’s fundamental rights jurisprudence.” NeJaime, supra note 58, at 231.
60. Yoshino, supra note 8, at 749.
61. For example, the Ninth Circuit has recently held that “Windsor requires that
heightened scrutiny be applied to equal protection claims involving sexual orientation.”
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 481 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that
it is a Batson violation to strike a juror on the basis of sexual orientation).
62. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2962.
63. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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Court identified this bond—or, more precisely, the choice whether
to enter this bond—as the source of the substantive due process
interest that is violated by a criminal sodomy statute:
[A]dults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the
confines of their homes and their own private lives and still
retain their dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds overt
expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct
can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual
persons the right to make this choice.64

One can reframe this passage as a syllogism, the conclusion of
which is that sexual conduct is constitutionally protected:
Premise (1): There is a constitutionally protected liberty interest
in the choice to enter a sexual “bond” with another individual
(irrespective of that individual’s sex).
Premise (2): Sexual conduct is partially constitutive of a sexual
bond between two persons.
Conclusion: There is a constitutionally protected interest in
sexual conduct.

Thus, as Katherine Franke observed in her influential critique of
Lawrence, the idea of a domestic “bond” between two persons “does
important normative work in the opinion.”65 Rather than articulating “a robust conception of sexual freedom,”66 Lawrence deems
sexual conduct to be constitutionally protected because it is
instrumental toward the development of a “bond that is more
enduring.”
In Windsor, the Court further develops the idea of a constitutionally protected, domestic bond that individuals may choose to enter
without unwarranted state interference. For Kennedy, just as sex

64. Id. at 567 (emphasis added).
65. Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 1399, 1408 (2004).
66. Id. at 1400.
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plays a constitutive role in shaping that bond, so too does marital
status:
Private, consensual sexual intimacy between two adult persons
of the same sex ... can form “but one element in a personal bond
that is more enduring.” By its recognition of the validity of samesex marriages performed in other jurisdictions and then by
authorizing same-sex unions and same-sex marriages, New York
sought to give further protection and dignity to that bond.67

Thus, as a federal law that “interfere[s] with the equal dignity of
same-sex marriages, a dignity conferred by the States in the exercise
of their sovereign power,”68 DOMA presents a special constitutional
threat. Like any law that was enacted for the purpose of stigmatizing gays and lesbians, it constitutes an equal protection violation.69
This would be true, even of a federal law that interfered with a
“routine [state] classification for purposes of certain statutory
benefits.”70 Kennedy makes clear, however, that DOMA interferes
with state laws that help to shape a liberty interest that is protected
under the Due Process Clauses. DOMA thus enacts a constitutional
injury beyond the denial of equal protection.
It is therefore inaccurate to characterize Windsor exclusively as
an equal protection case. The Court certainly makes clear that § 3
of DOMA violates the equal protection principles that apply to the
federal government by virtue of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. The Court also emphasizes, however, that DOMA interferes
with a state legal classification that is constitutive of a constitutionally protected domestic bond. In doing so, DOMA maligns that bond,
and thus infringes a liberty interest that underpins the Court’s
holding in Lawrence v. Texas.

67. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567) (citation omitted).
68. Id. at 2693.
69. See id. (“The Constitution’s guarantee of equality ‘must at the very least mean that
a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot’ justify disparate
treatment of that group.... DOMA’s avowed purpose and practical effect are to impose a
disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages
made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States.” (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973))).
70. Id. at 2692.
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This substantive due process reading of Windsor, while descriptively correct, is normatively problematic for those who wish for
courts to embrace a robust idea of sexual liberty. As described here,
Windsor further entrenches the conception of liberty that animated
the Court’s holding in Lawrence—a conception that treats basic
social choices (sex and marriage among them) as instrumentally
valuable insofar as they help cultivate dyadic, domestic bonds.71 But
however impoverished the constitutionally protected liberty interest
in Windsor might be, it is nevertheless a constitutionally protected
liberty interest. And, by identifying that liberty interest, one can use
Windsor to distill doctrinal propositions that could prove valuable
to advocates operating outside the area of same-sex marriage.
Here are two such doctrinal positions.
C. Proposition One: The Relevance of Unusual Discrimination
First, Windsor suggests that a law that threatens a liberty
interest is more likely to violate due process if it selectively imposes
a historically novel burden on a subordinated group. In Windsor, the
majority cited Romer v. Evans, an equal protection decision,72 for the
proposition that “[d]iscriminations of an unusual character especially suggest careful consideration to determine whether they are
obnoxious to the constitutional provision” at issue.73 Consistent with
this principle, the majority examined the “extent of the state power
and authority over marriage as a matter of history and tradition.”74
The Court observed that the “the Federal Government, throughout
our history, has deferred to state-law policy decisions with respect
to domestic relations.”75 DOMA, however, established a federal
definition of marriage that is uniform across states, and thus “depart[ed] from this history and tradition of reliance on state law to
define marriage.”76

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See Franke, supra note 65, at 1417.
517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996).
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 633).
Id. at 2691.
Id.
Id. at 2692.
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Some early commentators cited this historical examination to
argue that the majority’s decision was predicated on federalism.77
The majority asserted, however, that the “State’s power in defining
the marital relation is of central relevance in this case quite apart
from principles of federalism.”78 Instead, the Court deemed the
historical allocation of federal and state power to define marriage
relevant to whether DOMA impermissibly “impose[d] restrictions
and disabilities” on a constitutionally protected liberty interest.79
The Court thus made a subtly different use of history in Windsor
than is common in its substantive due process jurisprudence. Conventionally, the Court has relied on history to resolve the threshold
question of whether a liberty interest is sufficiently “fundamental” to
be protected under the Due Process Clauses.80 Specifically, whether
a right is “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty,”81 and thus
merits recognition under the Constitution’s Due Process Clauses,
depends on whether it is “deeply rooted in th[e] Nation’s history and
tradition.”82 Yoshino has argued that this historical requirement has
often constrained the recognition of new due process rights but plays
a diminished role in the Court’s new dignity jurisprudence.83
Specifically, Yoshino reads Lawrence as embracing a conception of
the Due Process Clauses under which the Framers “intended to
leave the content of the rights they guaranteed to the intelligence
of successive generations.”84 By adopting this understanding of due
process, Yoshino contends, the majority opinion in Lawrence “struck
the chains of history from due process jurisprudence.”85
With Windsor, the Court reintroduced history into its substantive due process analysis. It did so, however, by borrowing from its

77. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
78. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692.
79. See id.
80. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (declining to recognize
physician-assisted suicide as a constitutionally protected right); see also McDonald v. City of
Chic., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036, 3042 (2010) (holding that an individual’s Second Amendment
right to possess firearms is incorporated under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause).
81. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)).
82. Id. (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721).
83. See Yoshino, supra note 8, at 780.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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equal protection jurisprudence.86 Writing for the majority in
Windsor, Justice Kennedy used history in two interrelated ways.
First, Kennedy concluded that the states’ traditional power to define
marriage has made them the gatekeepers of a dignity interest that,
once conferred, deserves constitutional protection:
Here the State’s decision to give this class of persons the right
to marry conferred upon them a dignity and status of immense
import. When the State used its historic and essential authority
to define the marital relation in this way, its role and its power
in making the decision enhanced the recognition, dignity, and
protection of the class in their own community.87

This is a slight twist on the traditional due process inquiry articulated in Washington v. Glucksberg.88 There, the Court held that a
liberty interest may be constitutionally protected under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause if it is “deeply rooted
in th[e] Nation’s history and tradition.”89 In Windsor, the Court did
not inquire into the “deeply rooted” nature of the liberty interest at
stake, but instead examined the state’s historical role in shaping
and protecting that liberty interest through marital law. The fact
that states traditionally regulated marital relations, the Court
reasoned, gives such regulation constitutional significance when it
serves to validate a choice that is protected under the Due Process
Clauses. Here, the state of New York gave legal recognition to its
citizens’ constitutionally protected choice to enter into an intimate
pairwise bond with a person of the same sex. By doing so, the state
was able to “enhance[ ] the recognition, dignity, and protection” of
those who made this choice, and thereby strengthened the liberty
interest in the choice itself.90 Thus, Windsor suggested that history
is relevant not only to whether a liberty interest deserves constitutional protection, but whether states are able to strengthen that
interest through regulation.

86. For a detailed examination and defense of this type of doctrinal borrowing, see Tebbe
& Tsai, supra note 8.
87. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013).
88. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
89. Id. at 721 (internal quotation marks omitted).
90. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692; see supra Part I.B.
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Justice Kennedy’s second use of history involved an even more
significant departure from the conventional approach to historical
inquiry in due process cases, and a more explicit borrowing from the
Court’s equal protection jurisprudence. While due process cases
commonly focus on the history of a particular liberty interest,
Kennedy also considered the history of the government’s efforts to
infringe upon a liberty interest in a way that harms politically
subordinated groups. Specifically, Kennedy found the historically
exceptional nature of DOMA relevant to whether the government
had an adequate justification for invading the interest that New
York has strengthened by permitting same-sex marriage. Whereas
New York broadened its definition of marriage to “enhance[ ] the
recognition, dignity, and protection” of a subordinated group, “[t]he
Federal Government uses this state-defined class ... to impose
restrictions and disabilities” on them.91 This was, Justice Kennedy
observed, an “unusual deviation from the usual tradition of recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage,” and “operate[d]
to deprive same-sex couples of the benefits and responsibilities that
come with the federal recognition of their marriages.”92 Because this
constitutes a “[d]iscrimination[ ] of an unusual character,” the Court
gave particularly “careful consideration” to DOMA’s effect on a
constitutionally protected dignity right.93 It may be premature to
equate this “careful consideration” with the traditional heightened
scrutiny standard that Justice Alito accused the majority of applying.94 At the very least, however, Windsor’s holding confirms that a
law’s effect on a politically subordinated group carries some
evidentiary weight with respect to whether the law violates due
process.
The majority’s use of history in Windsor thus follows a line of
reasoning that can be extended to other contexts. Specifically, the
majority deems history relevant both to whether the government
can strengthen a liberty interest through regulation, and to whether
the government may enact regulation that infringes upon that
interest. If the government exercises a well-established historical
power to strengthen a liberty interest, then its action will also
91.
92.
93.
94.

Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692.
Id. at 2693.
Id. at 2692 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)).
See id. at 2716 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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strengthen the degree to which the Constitution protects that
interest. If, however, the government breaks from historical practice
to infringe on that interest in a way that harms a subordinated
group, then the Court will be particularly cautious in evaluating
whether the infringement is justified.
D. Proposition Two: The Relevance of Legislators’ Motivations
The second doctrinal proposition one can distill from Windsor’s
holding builds on the first: if a law selectively targets a subordinated group, significant weight should be assigned to evidence in
the legislative record suggesting that the law was enacted for a
purpose that violates due process. According to one traditional view
of equal protection and due process, animus toward a protected
group is fatal under the Equal Protection Clause, whereas “there is
nothing specifically objectionable about that animus under the Due
Process ... Clauses.”95 The majority opinion in Windsor, however,
appears to reject a rigid distinction between animus’s relevance in
equal protection and due process contexts. In Windsor, the majority
concluded that DOMA violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause because its “principal purpose was to impose inequality” and
additionally that the law was not enacted “for other reasons like
governmental efficiency.”96 In support of these conclusions, the
Windsor majority offered the following account of the House Report
on DOMA:
The House Report announced its conclusion that “it is both
appropriate and necessary for Congress to do what it can to
defend the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage....
H.R. 3396 is appropriately entitled the ‘Defense of Marriage Act.’
The effort to redefine ‘marriage’ to extend to homosexual couples
is a truly radical proposal that would fundamentally alter the
institution of marriage.” ... The House concluded that DOMA
expresses “both moral disapproval of homosexuality, and a moral
95. Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 67
(1996).
96. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694. By contrast, Justices Scalia and Roberts both argued that
DOMA served the legitimate regulatory purposes of ensuring stability, see id. at 2696
(Roberts, J., dissenting), and “avoid[ing] difficult choice-of-law issues that will now arise
absent a uniform federal jurisdiction of marriage,” id. at 2708 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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conviction that heterosexuality better comports with traditional
(especially Judeo-Christian) morality.” ... The stated purpose of
the law was to promote an “interest in protecting the traditional
moral teachings reflected in heterosexual-only marriage laws.”
... Were there any doubt of this far-reaching purpose, the title of
the Act confirms it: The Defense of Marriage.97

Based largely on these statements, the Court concluded that
DOMA’s purpose was to ensure that state-recognized same-sex
unions would be “treated as second-class marriages for purposes of
federal law.”98 Thus, DOMA’s impact on same-sex couples appears
to have motivated the Court to place significant weight on legislative statements evincing an unconstitutional purpose.99
Windsor’s holding therefore helps to clarify a longstanding
confusion in the Court’s due process jurisprudence. In its modern
substantive due process jurisprudence, the Court has repeatedly
stressed that a law encroaching on a fundamental right is unconstitutional if it was enacted for an improper purpose.100 In placing
dispositive weight on whether DOMA’s impact on same-sex couples
was merely an “incidental effect of the federal statute” or its
“essence,”101 the Windsor majority reaffirmed this approach. Before
Windsor, however, the Court was rarely clear about the relevance
97. Id. at 2693 (first alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104664, at 12-13, 16 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2916, 2920).
98. Id. at 2693-94. The Court also reached its conclusion based on arguments the
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives made in defense of DOMA
and on how DOMA operates in practice. See id.
99. The Ninth Circuit recently recognized that Windsor’s holding rested on an
examination of DOMA’s purpose, and concluded from the Court’s analysis that heightened
scrutiny now applies to equal protection claims based on sexual orientation. See SmithKline
Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 481-82, 484 (9th Cir. 2014). The Ninth Circuit’s
holding in SmithKline Beecham, however, does not bar it from also recognizing that Windsor’s
holding is partially grounded in substantive due process principles, see supra Part I.B, and
accordingly that Windsor can be applied to clarify the scope of rights protected under the Due
Process Clause.
100. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (holding
that a law enacted for the “purpose ... of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus ... is invalid because the means chosen by the State
to further the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the woman’s free choice,
not hinder it”); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987) (holding that a pretrial
detention law violates substantive due process if the legislature “expressly intended” for the
law “to impose punitive restrictions”).
101. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693.
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of individual statements by legislators suggesting that their support
for a law was motivated by an invidious purpose.102 As Justice
Scalia’s dissent illustrates, one can easily invoke authorities that
condemn inquiry into the legislative motivations behind a statute
that serves a constitutionally legitimate purpose.103 Just as easily,
however, one can point to equal protection cases involving strict
scrutiny in which the Court considers “statements made by
decisionmakers or referendum sponsors” to be “relevant evidence of
discriminatory intent.”104 Moreover, one can identify “rational-basis”
equal protection cases in which the Court appears to have “invalidated laws on the basis of wrongful actual motivations, without
seriously exploring the possibility that another rightful purpose
might justify the statute.”105 In Windsor, the Court adopted this last,
actual intent approach to evaluate whether DOMA was intended to
deprive those in same-sex marriages of “the liberty of the person
protected by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.”106
The Windsor majority’s analysis, however, also suggests a
limitation to this actual intent approach to evaluating whether a
statute violates due process. In Romer v. Evans, the Court applied
rational basis review to invalidate a Colorado law based on evidence
that it was motivated by “animus” against a politically unpopular

102. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 500 (6th ed. 2009) (“Neither
the Court nor individual justices have been altogether consistent on the issue of review based
on actual purpose.”).
103. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2707 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It is a familiar principle of
constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on
the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.” (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 383 (1968))); see also, e.g., U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (“Where,
as here, there are plausible reasons for Congress’s action, our inquiry is at an end. It is, of
course, ‘constitutionally irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact underlay the legislative
decision,’ ... because this Court has never insisted that a legislative body articulate its reasons
for enacting a statute.” (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960))).
104. See City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188, 196-97
(2003); see also, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268
(1977) (“[L]egislative or administrative history may be highly relevant, especially where
there are contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking body, minutes of its
meetings, or reports.”).
105. Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values with
Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 1765 n.798 (2001)
(citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. 473
U.S. 432 (1985); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973)).
106. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695.
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group.107 Cass Sunstein offered a persuasive limiting principle for
this holding, according to which the Court will “look behind enactments” for the narrow purpose of determining whether they were
motivated by “animus” toward a politically unpopular group.108
Similarly, Justice Kennedy’s opinion used animus against a
subordinated group as the trigger for skeptically examining the
motivations behind DOMA.109 Windsor thus establishes a subtle, but
important corollary to the limiting principle Sunstein identified: if
a law appears to selectively target a politically unpopular group,
courts will “look behind enactments” to determine whether the law
was motivated by a purpose that is impermissible under the Due
Process Clauses.
By linking its examination of DOMA’s purpose to the law’s effect
on a subordinated group, the Windsor majority overcame a significant normative obstacle to considering legislators’ motivations in
substantive due process cases: the long shadow of Lochner v. New
York.110 As discussed above, the Court has been notably unclear as
to the role that legislative history should play in evaluating whether
a law violates due process because it was enacted for an improper
purpose.111 By contrast, in constitutional cases that do not turn on
substantive due process, the Court “rarely hesitate[s]” to “consider[]
legislative history and other information about the legislature’s
inner workings.”112 This discrepancy may owe in part to the Lochner
Court’s ill-supported speculation as to the motivations behind a New
York law regulating the hours of bakery workers. In striking down
the law, the Lochner Court rejected the state’s contention that the
law was enacted to protect workers’ health, asserting: “It is
impossible for us to shut our eyes to the fact that many of the laws
of this character, while passed under what is claimed to be the
107. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
108. Sunstein, supra note 95, at 10.
109. See, e.g., Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (“The Federal Government uses this statedefined class ... to impose restrictions and disabilities. That result requires this Court now to
address whether the resulting injury and indignity is a deprivation of an essential part of the
liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment.”).
110. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
111. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
112. Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1784, 1855
(2008); see id. at 1855-56 (providing examples from the First Amendment, Commerce Clause,
Ex Post Facto Clause, and Bill of Attainder Clause cases).
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police power for the purpose of protecting the public health or
welfare, are, in reality, passed from other motives.”113 Given
Lochner’s notoriety, it is unsurprising courts have been equivocal
about whether to consider legislators’ motivations in contemporary
substantive due process cases.114
The majority’s approach in Windsor, however, offers a way to
consider legislative purpose in substantive due process cases
without inviting comparisons to Lochner. Specifically, the majority
declines to endorse an unmoored investigation into legislative
motivations in any substantive due process case. Instead it suggests
that such a search should be limited to cases in which the challenged law selectively burdens a subordinated group. In advancing
such a limitation, the majority echoes the work of process-based
theorists, who seek to constrain judicial discretion by arguing that
judicial review should primarily serve to correct defects in political
decision making.115 The Windsor majority, however, offers a way to
apply the insights of process theory to substantive due process—a
doctrine that process theorists have famously criticized.116 Specifically, the Windsor majority links its substantive due process
intervention to a concern that motivated John Ely: the systematic
disadvantage of subordinated minorities in the political process.117
Whether or not the majority’s approach is plausible as a strategy for
cabining judicial discretion,118 it is certainly an important doctrinal
113. Id.
114. Cf. Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 417-19 (2011) (discussing
Lochner’s position in the “anticanon” as an exemplar of judicial error).
115. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980); Michael C. Dorf & Samuel Issacharoff, Can Process Theory Constrain Courts?, 72 U.
COLO. L. REV. 923 (2001); Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process
Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747 (1991).
116. See ELY, supra note 115, at 18; John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment
on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); see also Dorf & Issacharoff, supra note 115, at 929
(discussing the influence of Ely’s arguments concerning substantive due process on the
Supreme Court).
117. See ELY, supra note 115, at 135-79 (defending the Warren Court’s equal protection
cases as legitimate interventions in cases where subordinated minorities were excluded from
the political process).
118. Compare Dorf & Issacharoff, supra note 115 (arguing that process theory offers a
viable way of constraining judicial discretion), with Mark Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of
Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 105557 (1980) (arguing that Ely’s theory fails to offer the determinacy necessary to constrain
judicial behavior).
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innovation that could be applied in other substantive due process
contexts.
In summary, Windsor’s holding shows that laws that appear to
selectively target a subordinated group may be examined more
carefully than those that have no obvious equality dimension. The
majority opinion makes use of, and legitimizes, two interrelated
types of doctrinal borrowing from the Court’s equal protection cases
in its due process jurisprudence. First, the opinion suggests that
courts should examine a law’s historical context to determine
whether it selectively imposes a novel burden on a politically
unpopular group. Second, if the law does impose such a burden,
courts should assign significant weight to evidence that the law was
enacted for a constitutionally prohibited motive.
I have no doubt that, by translating Windsor into these terms,
I am presenting an overly sanguine portrayal of the majority
opinion’s clarity and analytical rigor. Such portrayals, however, are
sometimes necessary in order to treat legal opinions as binding
sources of law from which one can reason to resolve new legal
questions.119 By distilling concrete doctrinal propositions from the
majority’s analysis, one can use Windsor to help solve doctrinal
puzzles as well as create them.
II. DUE PROCESS AND UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS’ BAIL
To illustrate how Windsor’s holding can help resolve other due
process questions that have significant equality dimensions, I turn
to an emerging constitutional problem that has received little
judicial attention. In recent years, three states have enacted laws
that require judges to deny bail to undocumented immigrants who
are arrested for a range of felonies.120 Traditionally, in noncapital
criminal cases, judges are required to make an individualized
determination of whether a defendant should be released on bail
pending trial.121 However, under an Alabama statute enacted in
119. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
120. See ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 22(A)(4); ALA. CODE § 31-13-18 (2012); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 544.470(2) (2008).
121. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951) (“Since the function of bail is limited, the fixing
of bail for any individual defendant must be based upon standards relevant to the purpose of
assuring the presence of that defendant.”); see also Caleb Foote, The Coming Constitutional
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2011 as part of a comprehensive anti-immigration bill,122 judges are
forbidden from granting bail to any person “who is determined to be
an alien unlawfully present in the United States.”123 Similarly, a
Missouri statute enacted in 2008 forbids judges from granting bail
to defendants whom they “reasonably believe[ ]” to be “an alien
unlawfully present in the United States.”124 If the defendant is later
unable to “prove his or her lawful presence,” he or she must
“continue to be committed to the jail and remain until discharged by
due course of law.”125 To date, no court has considered whether these
statutes violate the Constitution’s equal protection or due process
guarantees.126
Arizona, however, enacted not only the first of these three laws,
but also the most detailed and the only one that courts have
addressed.127 In 2006, the state amended its constitution by means
of a ballot initiative known as “Proposition 100.”128 As amended,
Arizona’s constitution establishes a presumption that “[a]ll persons
charged with crime shall be bailable” but carves out an exception to
this rule if a person has been arrested “[f]or serious felony offenses
as prescribed by the legislature if the person charged has entered or
remained in the United States illegally and if the proof is evident or
the presumption great as to the present charge.”129 The Arizona
Crisis in Bail: I, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 975-78 (1965) (discussing founding era bail laws
according defendants the right to an individualized bail determination in noncapital cases).
122. See Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, 2011 Ala. Acts
535.
123. ALA. CODE § 31-13-18.
124. MO. REV. STAT. § 544.470(2).
125. Id.
126. In a case brought by the United States, a federal district court enjoined several
provisions of the Alabama bill that categorically denied bail to undocumented immigrants.
See United States v. Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1293 (N.D. Ala. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part, dismissed in part, 691 F.3d 1269 (2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2012 (2013). The
Eleventh Circuit upheld most of these injunctions. See Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1301. However,
the United States did not challenge the bill’s bail provision, ALA. CODE § 31-13-18, and the
district and appellate courts thus did not have the occasion to address its constitutionality.
127. See Lopez-Valenzuela v. Cnty. of Maricopa, 719 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2013); Hernandez
v. Lynch, 167 P.3d 1264 (Ariz. 2007). In addition to challenging the Arizona law on due
process grounds, the petitioners in Lopez-Valenzuela raised constitutional preemption,
excessive bail, and right to counsel claims—all of which the court rejected. Lopez-Valenzuela,
719 F.3d at 1057.
128. Lopez-Valenzuela, 719 F.3d at 1057. This Article’s description of Proposition 100
closely follows the Ninth Circuit panel’s account of the law in Lopez-Valenzuela.
129. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 22(A)(4). The constitutional provision also carves out exceptions
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legislature has enacted several laws implementing this provision,
including a rule forbidding judges from releasing a defendant on
bail “if the court finds (1) that the proof is evident or the presumption great that the person committed a serious offense, and (2)
probable cause that the person entered or remained in the United
States illegally.”130 While Arizona’s constitution does not define
“serious felony offense,” the state’s legislature has defined it by
statute as “any Class 1, 2, 3, or 4 felony or aggravated driving-underthe-influence offense.”131 Thus defined, Proposition 100 covers a
broad range of nonviolent felonies, including unlawfully copying or
selling sound recordings,132 altering a lottery ticket with intent to
defraud,133 and computer tampering with intent to defraud.134 “Noncustodial sentences are possible for several of these crimes.”135
A. The Insights and Limitations of Equal Protection
Proposition 100, like its Missouri and Alabama counterparts,
would seem to raise obvious equal protection concerns. Under the
Arizona law, courts are constitutionally forbidden to grant pretrial
release to undocumented immigrants arrested for some felonies,
but are constitutionally required to make individualized bail determinations for all other defendants arrested for those offenses. The
group this law selectively burdens, undocumented immigrants, is undoubtedly subordinated and politically marginalized.136 Moreover,

to the general bailability rule for defendants charged with capital offenses and certain sex
offenses, id. § 22(A)(1), defendants charged with felonies while released on bail, id. § 22(A)(2),
and defendants who pose a substantial public danger, id. § 22(A)(3).
130. ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 7.2(b).
131. Lopez-Valenzuela, 719 F.3d at 1057; see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3961(A)(5)(b)
(2013).
132. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3705.
133. Id. § 5-566.
134. Id. § 13-2316.
135. Lopez-Valenzuela, 719 F.3d at 1078 n.7 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
136. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (“Aliens as a class are a prime
example of a ‘discrete and insular’ minority.” (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods., Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938))); Jason H. Lee, Unlawful Status as a “Constitutional
Irrelevancy”?: The Equal Protection Rights of Illegal Immigrants, 39 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
1, 2 (2008) (citing evidence of public animus toward undocumented immigrants).

2198

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:2171

alienage is one of only five classifications to which the Supreme
Court has formally applied heightened scrutiny.137
However, while no court has analyzed whether Proposition 100
violates the Equal Protection Clause,138 such a claim could face
several doctrinal hurdles. The Court’s decision in Graham v.
Richardson, applying strict scrutiny to classifications based on
alienage,139 is typically regarded as the “high-water mark of judicial
protection of aliens.”140 Since then, the Court has applied rational
basis review to federal alienage laws in recognition of Congress’s
constitutional authority over immigration and naturalization
issues.141 Although the Court has continued applying heightened
scrutiny to state laws targeting aliens,142 whether this level of review would apply to laws targeting undocumented immigrants in
criminal cases is unclear. First, the case law is unclear as to which
standard of review should apply to state laws regulating undocumented (as opposed to “legal”) aliens. In Plyler v. Doe, the Court
applied intermediate scrutiny to invalidate a Texas statute excluding undocumented immigrants from public schools,143 but at the
same time cautioned that “[u]ndocumented aliens cannot be treated
137. See Graham, 403 U.S. at 372 (applying heightened scrutiny to a statute conditioning
welfare benefits on citizenship). The other four classifications to which the Court has formally
applied heightened scrutiny are race, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); national
origin, see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215-16 (1944); sex, see Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); and the marital status of one’s parents, see Trimble v. Gordon, 430
U.S. 762, 766-67, 769 (1977). See also Yoshino, supra note 8, at 756 & nn. 63-71 (identifying
the five heightened scrutiny classifications and observing that “[a]ll classifications based on
other characteristics—including age, disability, and sexual orientation—currently receive
rational basis review”) (citations omitted).
138. The plaintiffs-appellants did not bring an equal protection claim in the Ninth Circuit
case reviewing Proposition 100. See Lopez-Valenzuela, 719 F.3d at 1057. In the Arizona case
challenging Proposition 100, the petitioners did in fact raise an equal protection claim. See
Hernandez v. Lynch, 167 P.3d 1264, 1270 (Ariz. 2007). The Arizona Supreme Court declined
to “subject Proposition 100 to an independent equal protection analysis,” however, based on
the bizarre assumption that “[s]uch an analysis is unnecessary because its result will be
identical to the result of the inquiry ... [one] must undertake to determine whether
Proposition 100 comports with due process.” Id.
139. Graham, 403 U.S. at 372.
140. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1548 (2d ed. 1988).
141. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-82, 86-87 (1976).
142. See Adam Bryan Wall, Justice for All? The Equal Protection Clause and Its Not-SoEqual Application to Legal Aliens, 84 TUL. L. REV. 759, 766-67 (2010).
143. 457 U.S. 202, 205 (1982) (describing the statute); id. at 223-24 (holding that the Texas
statute “can hardly be considered rational unless it furthers some substantial goal of the
State”).
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as a suspect class because their presence in this county in violation
of the law is not a ‘constitutional irrelevancy.’ ”144 Second, the Court
has applied rational basis review to state laws that restrict aliens
from participating in activities that are central to the state’s sovereign functioning.145 While these laws are easily distinguishable
from provisions that deny bail to undocumented immigrants,146 they
nonetheless demonstrate the Court’s reluctance to intervene in
functions it deems central to a state’s “right to govern.”147
Thus, with regard to state laws governing undocumented immigrants, the Court’s equal protection doctrine is complicated at
best, contradictory at worst. This is not to suggest that equal protection doctrine cannot, or should not, be used to challenge laws that
categorically deny bail to undocumented immigrants. However,
given the Court’s steady retrenchment of protections afforded under
the Equal Protection Clause,148 the drawbacks of such a strategy are
considerable.
B. The Insights and Limitations of Due Process
In contrast to the challenges of analyzing bail laws targeting
undocumented immigrants under the Equal Protection Clause, the
144. Id. at 223.
145. See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 447 (1982) (upholding a California law
requiring state “peace officers” to be U.S. citizens); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 80-81
(1979) (upholding a New York statute requiring public school teachers to be U.S. citizens);
Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 297, 299-300 (1978) (upholding a New York law restricting
membership in the state police force to U.S. citizens).
146. The Court has been quick to uphold state laws that make citizenship a requirement
for public positions that involve “the basic functions of government,” Foley, 435 U.S. at 297,
but it has not applied rational basis to laws that target aliens for special burdens.
Furthermore, in Foley, the Court concluded that state classifications based on alienage
merit heightened scrutiny if they threaten “the noncitizens’ ability to exist in the community.”
Id. at 295. State bail laws that categorically prevent undocumented immigrants from being
released into the community pending trial would thus seem to be a prime example of a law
that should merit heightened scrutiny.
147. Id. at 297; see also Plyler, 457 U.S. at 228 n.23 (“Despite the exclusive federal control
of this Nation’s borders, we cannot conclude that the States are without any power to deter
the influx of persons entering the United States against federal law, and whose numbers
might have a discernible impact on traditional state concerns.”).
148. See, e.g., Yoshino, supra note 8, at 757-76 (describing how the Court has limited its
equal protection jurisprudence by limiting the number of classifications that receive heightened scrutiny, reducing protections for those groups that fall within a protected class, and
invalidating legislation designed to remedy discrimination).
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Court’s due process doctrine provides a relatively clear framework
for evaluating their constitutionality. The governing standard for
pretrial detention laws was established in United States v. Salerno.149
Under the federal Bail Reform Act of 1984 challenged in Salerno,
judges are empowered to deny pretrial release to defendants
charged with certain serious felonies150 upon finding that “no
condition[s]” of pretrial release can “reasonably assure ... the safety
of any other person and the community.”151 The Court rejected arguments that the Bail Reform Act violates the Eighth Amendment’s
Excessive Bail Clause152 and that the law violates substantive due
process.153
Although it rejected the petitioner’s due process challenge, the
Court affirmed that pretrial detention laws implicate a fundamental
right.154 Salerno and related cases thus make clear that heightened
scrutiny applies to any state pretrial detention law.155 This height
149. 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987). In addition to the substantive claims addressed in Salerno,
the Court also articulated the standard for raising a facial constitutional challenge to a
statute. See id. at 745 (“A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult
challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.”). But see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and
Fiction About Facial Challenges, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 915, 919 (2011) (arguing that in practice
the Court’s standard for evaluating facial challenges is not as stringent as this language
suggests).
150. Specifically, under the Bail Reform Act, pretrial detention is authorized in cases
involving crimes of violence, offenses punishable by death or life imprisonment, drug offenses
punishable by more than ten year’s imprisonment, certain offenses involving a minor victim,
and offenses committed by a person who has previously been convicted of two or more serious
felonies. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1) (2012).
151. Id. § 3142(e); see Salerno, 481 U.S. at 742.
152. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 752-55. While a full discussion of the Court’s Excessive Bail
Clause analysis is beyond this Article’s scope, Salerno contains dicta that makes challenging categorical denial of bail under this provision difficult. See id. at 752 (“The Eighth
Amendment addresses pretrial release by providing merely that ‘[e]xcessive bail shall not be
required.’ This Clause, of course, says nothing about whether bail shall be available at all.”);
cf. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (“Unless th[e] right to bail before trial is preserved, the
presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning.”).
153. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746-52.
154. See id. at 750; see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 93 (1992) (invalidating a
state law that allowed for the continued confinement of defendants acquitted on an insanity
defense regardless of whether examining doctors recommended release and stating that
“[f]reedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause from arbitrary government action”).
155. Interestingly, Justices have cited Salerno’s heightened scrutiny standard when
condemning what they perceive to be unwarranted extensions of the standard to other due
process contexts. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
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ened scrutiny standard requires a threefold inquiry into whether a
pretrial detention law “constitutes impermissible punishment or
permissible regulation.”156 As a threshold matter, a pretrial detention law violates due process if the legislature “expressly intended
to impose punitive restrictions.”157 If the detention law survives this
examination of legislative intent, it will satisfy due process if (1) “an
alternative purpose to which the restriction may rationally be
connected is rationally assignable to it”—that is, the law serves “a
legitimate regulatory goal”—and (2) the law does not “appear[ ]
excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned to it.”158
The Court subsequently confirmed that this twofold inquiry is
equivalent to the more conventional heightened scrutiny examination into whether a law that infringes a “fundamental” liberty
interest “is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”159
Salerno’s application of this heightened scrutiny standard provides further guidance as to what safeguards must exist for a
pretrial detention provision to satisfy due process. First, the Court
held that “[t]he legislative history of the Bail Reform Act clearly
indicates that Congress did not formulate the pretrial detention
(“We have held repeatedly, in cases the Court today does not overrule, that only fundamental
rights qualify for ... so-called heightened scrutiny protection—that is, rights which are deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” (citing, inter alia, Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751))
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Foucha, 504 U.S. at 93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(“We have often subjected to heightened due process scrutiny, with regard to both purpose and
duration, deprivations of physical liberty imposed before a judgment is rendered under this
standard.” (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750-51)).
156. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747; see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979) (“Due
process requires that a pretrial detainee not be punished.”).
157. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747.
158. Id. (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).
159. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993) (citing Salerno among a “line of cases”
that applies this standard). In its decision upholding Proposition 100, the Ninth Circuit failed
to recognize that Salerno required this heightened scrutiny standard; the Lopez-Valenzuela
court frequently misstated the applicable standard of review and conflated the analytically
distinct inquiries that Salerno requires. Lopez-Valenzuela v. Cnty. of Maricopa, 719 F.3d
1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he correct inquiry under Salerno is whether Proposition 100
is reasonably related to the legitimate governmental objective of controlling the flight risk.”)
(alterations and internal quotation marks omitted); id. at 1064 (“To strike down Proposition
100 ... would require us to find that Proposition 100 ‘is not reasonably related to a legitimate
goal’ and is ‘arbitrary and purposeless’ such that we ‘may infer that the purpose of the
governmental action is punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted.’ ” (quoting Bell,
441 U.S. at 539)); id. (“Because Proposition 100 is reasonably related to the legitimate goal
of controlling flight risk, we hold that it is not excessive in violation of substantive due process
under the Constitution of the United States.”).
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provisions as punishment for dangerous individuals.”160 Next, the
Court affirmed that the law’s purpose was to “prevent[ ] danger to
the community,” and that this purpose is doubtless a “legitimate
regulatory goal.”161 Finally, the Court identified several limiting
features of the law that ensured it was not “excessive in relation” to
its regulatory goal:
The Bail Reform Act carefully limits the circumstances under
which detention may be sought to the most serious of crimes....
The arrestee is entitled to a prompt detention hearing, ... and the
maximum length of pretrial detention is limited by the stringent
time limitations of the Speedy Trial Act. Moreover, ... the conditions of confinement envisioned by the Act appear to reflect the
regulatory purposes relied upon by the Government.... [T]he
statute at issue here requires that detainees be housed in a
facility separate, to the extent practicable, from persons awaiting
or serving sentences or being held in custody pending appeal.162

The Court further emphasized that the Bail Reform Act entitled
individuals to a “full-blown adversary hearing” on their eligibility
for pretrial release163 and permitted judges to deny release only if
they found that “no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the
safety of any other person and the community.”164 In light of these
safeguards, the Court held that the law was adequately tailored to
its goal of ensuring public safety.
As the dissenting opinions illustrate, Salerno’s holding is not
beyond criticism.165 Whatever its vices, however, Salerno possesses
160. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on the detailed Senate Judiciary Committee Report on the Bail Reform Act, which emphasized that the bill’s purpose was to empower courts to deny pretrial release to a “small but identifiable group of particularly dangerous defendants as to whom neither the imposition of stringent release conditions
nor the prospect of revocation of release can reasonably assure the safety of the community
or other persons.” S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 6-7 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3189.
161. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747.
162. Id. at 747-48 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
163. Id. at 750.
164. Id. at 742 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1) (2012)).
165. See id. at 755-56 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 767-68 (Stevens, J., dissenting). One
of the principal objections is that, by authorizing judges to determine a defendant’s future
danger, the Bail Reform Act requires courts to treat untried indictments as evidence, and
thereby threatens the presumption of innocence. See id. at 762-66 (Marshall, J., dissenting);
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the virtue of clarity relative to the Court’s equal protection cases
concerning alienage. Accordingly, Salerno offers a useful due process
tool for addressing equality concerns that arise from states’
treatment of undocumented immigrants.166 There are, however, at
least two underdeveloped dimensions of Salerno’s holding that
appear to have been a source of confusion to those courts that have
evaluated the constitutionality of Arizona’s bail law.
First, courts have struggled to identify the correct historical
inquiry with respect to whether a bail law targeting undocumented
immigrants violates due process. The Supreme Court has made
clear that, in due process cases, a “universal and long-established
tradition” may create a “strong presumption” that a particular
liberty restriction is constitutional.167 Less clear, however, is the
level of precision with which one should define a particular historical “tradition” of restricting liberty. As both the Ninth Circuit and
the Arizona Supreme Court have observed, many states have
enacted laws that restrict the right to bail for serious felonies.168 For
example, a longstanding, but limited, exception to the general rule
requiring an individualized assessment of flight risk applies to
capital cases.169 There are, however, at least two ways of framing
the relevance of this information.
One could simply treat the historical existence of these bail
restrictions as evidence that a state does not infringe on a right
that is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”170 by
see also Larry Laudan & Ronald J. Allen, Deadly Dilemmas II: Bail and Crime, 85 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 23, 23-24 n.4 (2010) (providing a survey of the academic debate concerning Salerno
and cases that uphold civil detention laws).
166. Cf. Yoshino, supra note 8, at 750-51 (“The Court has long used the Due Process
Clauses to further equality concerns.”).
167. Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2347-48 (2011) (quoting
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 785 (2002)).
168. See Lopez-Valenzuela v. Cnty. of Maricopa, 719 F.3d 1054, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 2013);
Hernandez v. Lynch, 167 P.3d 1264, 1274 (Ariz. 2007).
169. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 753 (observing that a court may “refuse bail in capital cases”).
This capital felony exception has roots in English common law. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *298-300; see also United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 997 (2d
Cir. 1986) (discussing the history of discretionary bail determinations in capital cases).
Consistent with this tradition, the Judiciary Act of 1789 permitted, but did not require, judges
to deny bail in capital cases based on “the nature and circumstances of the offence, and of the
evidence, and the usages of law.” Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91.
170. McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010) (quoting Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
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enacting new laws that categorically deny bail to certain classes of
defendants. The Ninth Circuit panel, for example, appears to have
adopted this approach in holding that Arizona’s bail law is “neither
unprecedented nor unique” and that Proposition 100 is “nothing
more than an extension of Arizona’s existing pretrial detention
scheme.”171 Under this approach, if states have traditionally been
empowered to create statutory exceptions to the right to an individualized bail determination, then nothing is problematic about
Arizona creating another such exception.
An alternative approach, however, is to examine whether a bail
law is historically exceptional in terms of who it targets for unequal
treatment. Under this approach, courts would accord significance to
the fact that a law appears to impose a novel form of discrimination.
The salient question would therefore be whether Proposition 100 is
novel in terms of classifying defendants based on a characteristic
unrelated to the severity of the felony for which they have been
charged. If one adopts the conventional position that “[t]he Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses have very different offices,”172
this information would be of little relevance. With respect to bail
laws targeting illegal immigrants, however, the fact that a law
imposes a novel form of discrimination seems obviously relevant
both to whether a bail law is “excessive in relation” to a legitimate
regulatory goal, and to whether the legislature “expressly intended”
for the law to be a form of punishment.173
Unfortunately, there is little case law clarifying which of these
approaches is correct. The Court has often stressed the relevance of
historical inquiry to the determination of whether a right should be
recognized as sufficiently fundamental to be protected under the
Due Process Clauses.174 In undertaking this inquiry, courts should
define the right with enough specificity for history to provide a
meaningful constraint on judicial law making under the Due
Process Clauses.175 It is already settled, however, that state bail
171. Lopez-Valenzuela, 719 F.3d at 1062-63.
172. Sunstein, supra note 95, at 67.
173. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747.
174. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
175. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (“[W]e have required in substantive-due-process cases
a careful description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest. Our Nation’s history, legal
traditions, and practices thus provide the crucial guideposts for responsible decisionmaking
that direct and restrain our exposition of the Due Process Clause.”) (citations and internal
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laws implicate a fundamental right to be free from bodily
restraint.176 Therefore, in evaluating laws denying bail to undocumented immigrants, the role of historical inquiry is to determine
whether the laws are adequately tailored to a legitimate regulatory
interest. As to this question, the Court’s due process cases do not
explicitly address the level of generality at which a historical
inquiry should be framed.
The second underdeveloped dimension of Salerno’s holding
concerns the relevance of legislative history to whether the legislature “expressly intended” for a detention law to be punitive.
Generally, the function of heightened scrutiny is to “smoke out”
improperly motivated government action.177 The Court has been
unclear, however, as to what evidentiary weight should be placed on
statements in the legislative record suggesting that particular
legislators had improper motivations for supporting the law.178 In
Salerno, the Court relied on statements and findings in the
legislative record to conclude that Congress did not intend for the
Bail Reform Act to be punitive.179 However, there appears to be little
case law applying Salerno in which courts have identified statements in the legislative record suggesting that the law was intended
to be punitive.180
In another context in which a statute’s punitive intent is
constitutionally fatal—bill of attainder claims181—federal appellate
courts have declined to conclude that the legislature possessed
quotation marks omitted).
176. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
177. Cf. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995) (“[T]he purpose of
strict scrutiny [in equal protection cases] is to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by assuring
that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly
suspect tool.” (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989))); Elena
Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment
Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 414 (1996) (arguing that First Amendment law is structured
to ferret out improper government motives).
178. See supra notes 102-105 and accompanying text.
179. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987).
180. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit panel’s decision upholding Proposition 100 is the only case
I have identified in which the court addressed such statements. Lopez-Valenzuela v. Cnty. of
Maricopa, 719 F.3d 1054, 1059-62 (9th Cir. 2013).
181. See Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Grp., 468 U.S. 841, 846-47
(1984) (defining a bill of attainder as “a law that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts
punishment upon an identifiable individual without provision of the protections of a judicial
trial”).
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punitive intent based on individual statements in the legislative
record.182 Such an approach sits uncomfortably, however, with the
realities underlying Arizona’s enactment of Proposition 100. To be
sure, Proposition 100’s legislative history includes statements that
the law is justified because undocumented immigrants pose a
greater flight risk than other individuals.183 Particularly striking,
however, is the number of statements arguing that the law was
justified to punish, in the words of State Representative Ray
Barnes, a crime “that ... has already been committed” when defendants entered the country illegally.184 To cite just a few of the
examples identified in the dissenting opinion of Lopez-Valenzuela v.
County of Maricopa, one of the bill’s sponsors, State Representative
Russell Pearce, explained that the Arizona law
bridges the gap, a loophole in the law that would allow people
who are not in this country [ ]legally who have no business to be
released if they commit any crime, they have no business being
released if they commit no crime, no additional crime [be]cause
they’re already in this country illegally.185

Pearce further urged Proposition 100’s enactment “on the ground
that ‘all illegal aliens in this country ought to be detained, debriefed and deported.’ ”186 Similarly, State Senator Jack Harper said,
“[W]hat part of illegal don’t we understand? Illegal aliens shouldn’t
be able to get bond for anything.”187
Thus, when reviewing Proposition 100, the Ninth Circuit
confronted a legislative record demonstrating that at least some of
182. See, e.g., ACORN v. United States, 618 F.3d 125, 141 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The legislative
record by itself is insufficient evidence for classifying a statute as a bill of attainder unless the
record reflects overwhelmingly a clear legislative intent to punish.”); Foretich v. United
States, 351 F.3d 1198, 1225 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“Several isolated statements are not sufficient
to evince punitive intent ... and cannot render a statute a bill of attainder without any other
indicia of punishment. Evidence in the legislative history can bolster our conclusion, however,
where other factors suggest punitiveness.”) (citations omitted) (alterations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
183. See Lopez-Valenzuela, 719 F.3d at 1060-61.
184. Id. at 1075 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 1074 (alterations in original).
186. Id.
187. Id. As Judge Fisher’s dissenting opinion observed, see id., these legislators failed to
recognize that “[a]s a general rule, it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain present
in the United States.” Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2505 (2012).
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the bill’s sponsors and supporters were motivated by a desire to
punish undocumented immigrants. Operating without clear guidance as to how to evaluate these statements, the Ninth Circuit
panel split the difference between declining to consider them and
giving them significant weight. Citing an equal protection case,188
the panel majority acknowledged the relevance of statements demonstrating individual legislators’ punitive motivations. It concluded,
however, that a “fair reading” of the record as a whole “does not
support ... [the] argument that Proposition 100’s primary purpose
is to punish and deter immigration offenses.”189 In a dissenting
opinion, Judge Fisher plausibly argued that “Salerno does not
require the plaintiffs to prove that punishment was the sole or even
the predominant purpose of the legislation,”190 and that “the record
plainly shows that lawmakers designed Proposition 100—at least in
large part—to punish undocumented immigrants for being in the
United States unlawfully.”191 The Ninth Circuit panel was therefore
split not only by conflicting interpretations of the record, but by
different views of what evidentiary weight one should assign to “bad
motivation” statements.
III. APPLYING WINDSOR
If Windsor is to offer more than a vague-but-promising vision of
“dignity,” practitioners must be capable of using it to address other
constitutional problems in which liberty and equality concerns are
deeply interrelated. State laws denying bail to undocumented
immigrants present precisely this type of problem. As explained
above, these laws raise obvious equality concerns, but are not easily
susceptible to an equal protection analysis.192 And although substantive due process offers a tractable framework for analyzing
188. City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188, 196-97 (2003).
189. Lopez-Valenzuela, 719 F.3d at 1060; see also id. at 1059-60 (“Having reviewed all of
the evidence, we are convinced[ ] ... that the record as a whole does not show that Proposition
100 was motivated by an improper punitive purpose.”).
190. Id. at 1075 n.2 (Fisher, J., dissenting). Judge Fisher further argued that, even if
Salerno required plaintiffs to prove that “punishment was the sole or even the predominant
purpose of the legislation,” the plaintiffs would have satisfied the requirement with respect
to Proposition 100. See id.
191. Id. at 1074.
192. See supra Part II.A.
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these laws, some areas of the doctrine that concern equality-related
issues are underdeveloped.193 If there were ever an area of law for
which equal protection doctrine could make the Due Process Clause
“all the more specific and all the better understood and preserved,”194 this would seem to be it.
To demonstrate that Windsor can be taken more seriously, or at
least deployed more usefully, than its detractors suggest, this Part
applies its holding to analyze whether Proposition 100, the Arizona
bail law, violates due process. Specifically, I will use the two
doctrinal propositions distilled from Windsor’s holding in Part I195
to address the due process issues that appear to have created
confusion for the Ninth Circuit panel in Lopez-Valenzuela.196 My
goal in doing so is to show that Windsor’s holding can be situated
within conventional due process doctrine and can be used to refine
and clarify due process claims that are plausible even without
recourse to Windsor. More broadly, I aim to show that Windsor’s
holding can be extended beyond the area of gay rights and used by
lawyers and judges who might otherwise be reluctant to invoke
what they perceive to be a controversial and confusing opinion.
A. Searching for Unusual Discrimination
First, Windsor’s holding can help clarify the historical inquiry
courts should undertake in deciding whether the Due Process
Clause permits laws categorically denying bail to undocumented
immigrants. In Lopez-Valenzuela, the panel correctly assumed that
historical inquiry is relevant to whether a bail law is sufficiently
tailored to a legitimate regulatory purpose.197 The panel framed its
historical inquiry, however, at a high level of generality. Specifically, it concluded that Proposition 100 was “neither unprecedented
nor unique” because state laws traditionally restricted bail for
defendants charged with capital offenses, and some states have
extended these laws to restrict bail for other particularly serious

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

See supra Part II.B.
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013).
See supra Part I.C-D.
See supra Part II.
See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
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felonies.198 Windsor’s holding, however, suggests that the court
should have framed its inquiry more precisely.
Under Windsor, I have argued, a law that threatens a liberty
interest is more likely to violate due process if it selectively imposes
a historically novel burden on a subordinated group.199 From this
proposition, it follows that in evaluating the constitutionality of
Proposition 100, one should undertake a historical inquiry that is
sufficiently precise to reveal any “[d]iscriminations of an unusual
character.”200 Such an inquiry must be more precise than the Ninth
Circuit panel’s in terms of examining both the type of classification
that Proposition 100 makes and the burdens that the law imposes.
First, one should evaluate whether state bail laws have traditionally included classifications based on alienage or, for that
matter, any other factors unrelated to the severity of the offense for
which a defendant was arrested. In recent years, such classifications
have begun to appear.201 For at least a few decades, some states’
case law has permitted judges to consider alienage as a bail
factor,202 and some federal courts have followed suit.203 Only
recently, however, have states begun to make statutory classifications based on alienage. A few states have enacted statutes
permitting judges to consider a defendant’s immigration status
when determining bail.204 Moreover, since Proposition 100’s enactment, two states passed laws categorically denying bail to
undocumented immigrants,205 and several others enacted statutes

198. Lopez-Valenzuela v. Cnty. of Maricopa, 719 F.3d 1054, 1063 (9th Cir. 2013); see supra
notes 168-73 and accompanying text.
199. See supra Part I.C.
200. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (citation omitted); see supra Part I.C.
201. See Gabriel J. Chin, Illegal Entry as Crime, Deportation as Punishment: Immigration
Status and the Criminal Process, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1417, 1423-24 (2011) (surveying state bail
laws that make classifications based on immigration status).
202. See id. at 1424 (citing cases from California, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, New Jersey,
New York, Ohio, and Texas). The earliest case Chin identifies is Van Atta v. Scott, 613 P.2d
210, 216 (Cal. 1980).
203. See Jason A. Cade, The Plea-Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, 34
CARDOZO L. REV. 1751, 1791 n.238 (2013) (citing United States v. Salas-Urenas, 430 F. App’x
721, 723 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v. Miguel-Pascual, 608 F. Supp. 2d 83, 86 (D.D.C.
2009); United States v. Chavez-Rivas, 536 F. Supp. 2d 962, 968-69 (E.D. Wis. 2008)).
204. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/110-5(a) (2013); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-15-30(B)(4)
(2012).
205. See ALA. CODE § 31-13-18 (2012); MO. REV. STAT. § 544.470(2) (2008).
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creating a rebuttable presumption that undocumented immigrants
should be denied bail.206
Traditionally, however, state laws restrict bail based on the
severity of the offense for which a defendant has been arrested
rather than on the characteristics of the offender.207 A few states
carve out exceptions to this rule of general applicability for defendants who are (1) charged with specific, serious offenses for which
they have previously been convicted,208 or (2) charged with a crime
committed while the defendant was released on bail, probation, or
parole.209 But typically, if a state chooses to categorically deny bail
in certain cases, it will restrict bail for any defendant charged with
a particularly serious (usually capital) offense.
By contrast, Proposition 100 appears to have been the first
statute to selectively deny bail to undocumented immigrants. The
Arizona law thus departs from traditional, generally applicable bail
laws by making a classification that is not predicated on a defendant’s prior conviction and is not based on a defendant’s demonstrated propensity to flee. This alone makes Proposition 100
significantly different from traditional state bail laws and should
therefore eliminate any historically rooted presumption that the
liberty infringement is constitutional.210 More striking, however, is
the fact that Proposition 100 classifies individuals based on their
membership in a subordinated and politically unpopular group.211
Moreover, Proposition 100 is unusual in terms of the severity of
the restriction it imposes. Traditionally, states permitted, but did

206. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-11-3(8)(c)(ii) (2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-22-9.5(4) (2009);
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-120.1 (2008).
207. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
208. See, e.g., R.I. CONST. art. I, § 9 (permitting denial of bail “for offenses involving the use
or threat of use of a dangerous weapon” if the defendant has previously been convicted of such
an offense, serious drug offenses, or a felony punishable by life imprisonment).
209. See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. I, § 15 (permitting denial of bail to a defendant charged
with a “violent felony” if it was committed while on bail, probation, or parole, or if the
defendant had previously been convicted of two or more such felonies).
210. Cf. Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2347-48 (2011) (“A universal
and long-established tradition of prohibiting certain conduct creates a strong presumption
that the prohibition is constitutional: Principles of liberty fundamental enough to have been
embodied within constitutional guarantees are not readily erased from the Nation’s
consciousness.” (quoting Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 785 (2002))
(alterations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
211. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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not require, judges to deny bail in capital cases based on a defendant’s likely guilt.212 This tradition is reflected in the language of
state constitutions that entitle prisoners to be released on bail upon
sufficient security “except for capital offenses, where the proof is
evident, or the presumption great.”213 Of the state supreme courts
that have interpreted such language in their constitutions, most
appear to have accepted its original understanding and concluded
that judges have the discretion to grant bail in capital cases.214
Moreover, in at least three states that have abolished the death
penalty, courts have held that there is now a right to bail in all
felony cases.215 Additionally, some states have adopted constitutional language clarifying that bail may be granted as a matter of
discretion in capital cases,216 while others have interpreted state
statutes to grant such discretion.217
Some state bail laws are indeed stricter than the traditional
capital felony exception in terms of both restricting bail in some
noncapital cases and forbidding judges to grant bail in those
cases.218 Compared to these laws, however, Proposition 100 restricts
bail for an exceptionally broad range of felonies—provided that the
defendant is an undocumented immigrant. With few exceptions,
212. See United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 997 (2d Cir. 1986) (discussing
the history of bail determinations in capital cases).
213. Id. (quoting CONN. CONST. art. I, § 14); see also Foote, supra note 121, at 975-76
(explaining that the language in eighteenth-century constitutions was understood to preserve
judicial discretion to grant bail in capital cases); Ariana Lindermayer, Note, What the Right
Hand Gives: Prohibitive Interpretations of the State Constitutional Right to Bail, 78 FORDHAM
L. REV. 267, 284 (2009) (identifying thirty-five state constitutions using this eighteenthcentury language).
214. See, e.g., State v. Arthur, 390 So. 2d 717, 718 (Fla. 1980) (citing cases and adopting the majority approach); State v. Hughbanks, 792 N.E.2d 1081, 1089 (Ohio 2003); see also Lindermayer,
supra note 213, at 290-98 (discussing other cases adopting the majority approach).
215. See Martin v. State, 517 P.2d 1389, 1394 n.17 (Alaska 1974); State v. Pett, 92 N.W.2d
205, 206 (Minn. 1958); State v. Johnson, 294 A.2d 245, 249 (N.J. 1972).
216. See MICH. CONST. art. I, § 15; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 8; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 15; WIS.
CONST. art. I, § 8; see also State v. Hill, 444 S.E.2d 255, 256 (S.C. 1994) (interpreting the
South Carolina Constitution as giving courts discretion to grant bail in capital cases); Ex parte
Howell, 245 P. 66, 66 (Okla. Crim. App. 1926) (interpreting the Oklahoma Constitution as
granting discretion to grant bail in capital cases).
217. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Baker, 177 N.E.2d 783, 785 (Mass. 1961).
218. See, e.g., People v. Dist. Court, 529 P.2d 1335, 1335-36 (Colo. 1974) (en banc) (interpreting Colorado’s constitution to forbid granting bail in capital cases); see also
Lindermayer, supra note 213, at 298-301 (identifying Arizona, Colorado, Pennsylvania, and
the Virgin Islands as categorically denying bail in capital cases).
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states that categorically deny bail for noncapital felonies do so only
for offenses punishable by life imprisonment.219 A few states permit
or require judges to deny bail in cases involving a broader range of
serious felonies, including sexual assault and major drug offenses.220
Even these states, however, restrict the right to bail for only a
limited number of serious felonies, the commission of which could
plausibly serve as evidence of a defendant’s dangerousness or
propensity to flee.221 Proposition 100, by contrast, requires judges to
deny bail for a broad range of felonies, including offenses for which
a noncustodial sentence is possible.222 Unlike the noncapital felonies
for which other states permit or require judges to deny bail, these
Arizona offenses have not historically been treated as strong
indicators of a defendant’s dangerousness or propensity to flee trial.
It is thus clear that Proposition 100 codifies “[d]iscriminations
of an unusual character,” and its constitutionality should therefore
receive “careful consideration.”223 The law’s putative regulatory goal
of managing flight risk at criminal trials is no doubt a compelling
governmental interest.224 Since the founding era, however, this
interest has been vindicated in noncapital cases by individually
assessing a defendant’s risk of flight and imposing bail conditions
designed to ensure that defendant’s appearance.225 Proposition 100,
by contrast, purportedly advances this goal by forbidding judges to
grant bail to any undocumented immigrant arrested for particular
felonies, including nonviolent ones. Given how dramatically these
innovations break with historical tradition, it is easy to conclude
that, insofar as it is not expressly punitive, Proposition 100 is

219. See Lindermayer, supra note 213, at 286 & n.121.
220. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 12 (restricting bail for felony sexual assault offenses);
R.I. CONST. art. I, § 9 (restricting bail for certain controlled substance offenses).
221. Cf. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987) (observing that the Bail Reform
Act “operates only on individuals who have been arrested for a specific category of extremely
serious offenses” and that “Congress specifically found that these individuals are far more
likely to be responsible for dangerous acts in the community after arrest”).
222. See Lopez-Valenzuela v. Cnty. of Maricopa, 719 F.3d 1054, 1078 n.7 (9th Cir. 2013)
(Fisher, J., dissenting).
223. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013) (quoting Louisville Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37-38 (1928)).
224. See Lopez-Valenzuela, 719 F.3d at 1061.
225. See, e.g., Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91 (establishing a right to bail
in noncapital cases).
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certainly “excessive in relation to”226 its asserted regulatory purpose
and therefore violates due process.
B. Weighing Legislators’ Motivations
Having established that Proposition 100 imposes “[d]iscriminations of an unusual character,”227 the second proposition this Article
distills from Windsor is relatively easy to apply. In evaluating
whether Proposition 100 violates due process because the legislature
“expressly intended” it to be punitive,228 the Ninth Circuit panel in
Lopez-Valenzuela disagreed as to the relevance of statements by
individual legislators expressing a desire to punish undocumented
immigrants.229 The majority concluded that, notwithstanding these
statements, the overall legislative record suggested that Proposition
100’s “primary purpose” was to manage flight risk.230 The Windsor
majority’s evaluation of DOMA’s legislative record, however,
suggests that the Ninth Circuit’s assessment of Proposition 100’s
legislative history was not sufficiently demanding.
Windsor’s holding, I have argued, suggests that if a law selectively targets a subordinated group, significant weight should be
assigned to evidence in the legislative record suggesting that the
law was enacted for a purpose that violates due process.231 By
subjecting undocumented immigrants to a more restrictive set of
bail laws than other criminal defendants, Proposition 100 singles
out and places special burdens upon a subordinated group.232
Moreover, Proposition 100’s legislative record includes a number of
statements by the bill’s sponsors and supporters suggesting that the
law should be enacted to punish those who entered the country
illegally.233 Indeed, some of the statements expressing hostility
toward undocumented immigrants were made by the same legislators who elsewhere claimed that they were supporting the law to

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (quoting Louisville Gas, 277 U.S. at 37-38).
See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747.
See supra notes 184-91 and accompanying text.
Lopez-Valenzuela v. Cnty. of Maricopa, 719 F.3d 1054, 1060 (9th Cir. 2013).
See supra Part I.D.
See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
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manage flight risk in criminal cases.234 Under the Court’s approach
in Windsor, the legislators’ statements revealing a constitutionally
forbidden motivation should be given greater weight than those
offering a constitutionally valid justification for the bill. Reading
Proposition 100’s legislative record in this manner, one would easily
conclude that the Arizona legislature “expressly intended” for the
law to be punitive.235
Ultimately, this assessment of the legislative record is consistent
with both pre-Windsor doctrine and legislative reality. While the
Supreme Court has sometimes endorsed using legislative history to
identify improper constitutional motivations,236 it is clear that legislators may manipulate the record to immunize a law against future
constitutional challenges.237 By suggesting that courts should weigh
statements of discriminatory intent more heavily than statements
offering a constitutionally legitimate goal, Windsor offers a commonsense way to resolve this tension.
CONCLUSION
The majority opinion in Windsor, it must be acknowledged,
invites a far more critical analysis than I offer here. This Article is
meant to illustrate, however, that it is possible to demystify
Windsor’s holding so that it can be of use to judges, advocates, and
others whose reasoning must conform to conventional doctrinal
norms. This process requires that one accept the vagaries and
internal contradictions that exist within Windsor, and develop an
interpretation of it that is compatible with stare decisis and other
234. Compare, e.g., Lopez-Valenzuela, 719 F.3d at 1060 (observing that one of the bill’s
sponsors, Representative Russell Pearce, “mentioned flight risk and public safety as the
primary reasons behind the Proposition 100 laws”), with id. at 1074 (Fisher, J., dissenting)
(“Rep. Pearce promoted the bill on the ground that ‘all illegal aliens in this country ought to
be detained, debriefed and deported.’ ”).
235. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987).
236. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
237. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
31-37 (1997); see also Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from
the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part
I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 948 (2013) (reporting, based on a detailed survey of 137 congressional
staffers who have legislative drafting responsibilities, that 69 percent of respondents said
“their expectations about how courts would rule on the constitutionality of statutes played a
significant role in the drafting process”).

2014]

WINDSOR BEYOND MARRIAGE

2215

fundamental norms of American law. By doing so, it is possible to
recognize Windsor’s value beyond the area of gay rights (as those
rights are conceived by Justice Kennedy)238 and to evaluate its
potential for groups who have not yet made significant strides under
the Court’s “dignity” doctrine.

238. Cf. Katherine M. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 15 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 236, 240 (2006) (suggesting that the “same-sex marriage movement has
accelerated and privileged the more assimilationist aspects of the gay rights struggle”).

